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ABSTRACT

It is well established that power is connected to networks, yet structural theories of power
in network analysis fail to satisfy political sociologists. Centrality is generally put forward as a
measure of power, but this is not enough for political sociology. This article puts forward a
theory of power that brings power resources and power dependency theory to the study of social
networks concerning political coalitions in an urban polity. Within this theory of power
resources, we embed power theories based on dependence (exchange theories) with power being
based on the inverse of the expected value of alternative courses of action, and social network
analysis focused on networks of powerful actors with significant power resources. The use of
social networks depends on the formation of coalitions of powerful individuals and groups who
then engage in political bargaining with other coalitions who want a different outcome. This
synthetic theory is illustrated with two examples of economic development and political conflict
in a moderately sized city.

Although power is one of sociology's favorite concepts in explaining class, race and
gender differences, it proves to be a slippery concept (Roscigno, 2011). Often the proof that one
group has more power than another is demonstrated by the use of power in producing a particular
outcome. For instance, one corporation had the power to buy a city block and destroy all the
historic buildings upon it, or during the Reagan administration the numerical majority of
Republicans were able to force their will on the Democrats by passing stringent budget measures
and tax cuts. Other uses of power in political sociology tend to view it as a capitalist constant so
that the results are somewhat inevitable. Both of these approaches leave a heavy post hoc ergo

propter hoc taste in the political sociologist's mouth. And bringing power to social networks has
been a difficult affair with centrality being an attractive but at the same time somewhat
frustrating concept - necessary but agonizingly insufficient because centrality lacks content.
Some post-modem conceptions of power even see it in a circular structure that leaves an
evanescent wisp that is difficult to track down (Dyberg, 1997). While we do not argue against
these approaches, we focus more on the mechanisms of power in an a priori way that could
predict power both before it is used and as a variable in different contexts and circumstances.
Consequently, this paper will provide a synthesis of three theories of power - power
resources, power dependency, and network centrality theories - to conceptualize a synthetic
approach to power in a political setting. It will then analyze two case studies of economic and
political development in a city context between business, the govermnent, the media and grass
roots social movements. We will try to show a more complex view of power that provides what
some previous theories have lacked. This is a measure of power with beliefs about the future and
assessments of current material forces embedded in a relational structure of networks that can
explain major outcomes in city politics.

1

Theories of Power and Politics

Four theories of power have been important in looking at competing groups in cities:
elite theory, power resources theory, power dependence theory, and network power theories.

I-Elite studies of Power in the US began with Floyd Hunter's (1953) elite theory applied
to the city of Atlanta using a reputational approach to the "real" holders of power rather than
those in obvious official positions. His structural-functional approach mapped the hierarchies and
interconnected webs of business, political and religious elites. The study promoted a large scale
examination of elite social networks. C. Wright Mills' book The Power Elite claimed a new
perspective on systems of power in the US. He identified three power groups - political,
economic and military- that formed a shifting coalition of power wielding elites and institutions
that ruled the US. Mills saw this group being created by rationalization in all advanced industrial
societies. The mechanisms of power are concentrated in the hands of a limited but corrupt group,
but Mills was not a great gatherer of evidence. In the 1969 Ralph Miliband put forth a theory of
elite power based on networks of elite power holders in the UK. His network approach, not
unlike Hunter's work, was excoriated by Ni cos Poulantzas who indicated that its nai:ve
positivism of social networks held no meaningful explanation of power in advanced
industrialized societies. Miliband attempted to defend his position (1972), but the largely
theoretical and rather non-empirical neo-Marxist work of Poulantzas ruled the day (1973, 1978).
Capital in the last instance had more power than mere social networks. Network studies
continued to be done, especially of corporate board membership, but these studies were much
less ambitious than the original elite theorists. Domhoffs early work (1967) was quite popular
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but was much criticized in the 1980s, and since then he (1998, 2010) has increased its rigor using
social networks and decreased some of the scope of his claims. By and large, we find elite theory
to be on the right track but too vague about the mechanisms of power.

2-Power Resources Theory. Power resources theory emerged from studies of the
welfare state most often with a quasi-Marxist focus (Korpi 1982, 1985; Berg and Janoski, 2005).
It focuses on who has more a priori resources than others and hence more power in determining a
later event. Mary Rogers (1974) distinguished between infra-resources that allow one entry into
the use of a resource, and instrumental resources that are the actual exercise of power. For
instance, she mentions that knowing a large number of people can lead to your subsequently
gaining access to and then persuading a particularly powerful person (with power resources) to
act in your behalf. This leads to an insight that social networks may be infra-resources but not the
actual instrumental resource itself. She also indicates that both of these types of resources are
embedded within social systems. However, the practice of power resources theory has not picked
up on Rogers lead into social networks. Most studies using power resources measure the political
power of left parties (seats, executive and cabinets) or the strength of unions in leading to
welfare state, economic, and immigration policies (Korpi 1982, 1985; Shalev 1983, 1992; Huber
and Stephens, 2001; Janoski, 2010). Other studies focus on money collected by each political
party in an election cycle, and some look at the profits of capitalist businesses. The only focus
that comes close to social networks concerns the coalition formation process that takes place
after an election, and these studies measure the distribution of cabinet seats in the final coalition
(Esping-Andersen 1985; Baldwin 1990; Hicks 2000; van Kersbergen 1996). But on the whole,
social networks and valued alternatives as resources tend to be ignored.

3

3-Power Dependency Theory. Exchange theory has little to say directly about political
sociology; however, it is rich in concepts of power that can be applied to political conflict. If one
looks beyond the micro-interactionist framework, exchange theory provides a clear theory of
political power being based on dependence. The basic elements of power are laid out by Richard
Emerson who died at an untimely and early age. The most political statement of exchange theory
power in a directly conflictual situation comes from Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler
(1980, 1981; see also Molm, 1985). The A has more power than B when Bis more dependent.
This can be expressed as !/(sum of the valued alternatives ofB) being greater than 1/(sum of the
valued alternatives of A). The first term is higher and A is more powerful when B has fewer
alternatives than A.

(1) Powera

(i.e., fewer alternatives for B means more power for A,
more alternatives for B mean less power for A.)
(2) Powen,

I I I Altai *Va1 ... Altan *Vn

(3) Net power of A over B

= Powera / Powen,
= [ IAita1*Va1 ... Altan*Vn] / [ IAltb1*Vb1 ... Altbn*Vn]

When the net power of A is greater than 1, A has more power, and when net power of A is less
than I, B has more power. This approach to power can be measured by searching out the
alternatives that A and B might have and taking their expected values (the subjective probability
of occurrence times the value of that occurrence). In terms of power resources theory, power
would be based on having greater net expected values of more numerous and valuable
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alternatives. This can be transferred to group bargaining with labor and management (as done by
Bacharach and Lawler), or political conflict in a community (as we do here). Refinements to this
strategy can be seen in the more recent exchange literature (Schaefer, 2009; Toye, 2000), but
again, they are oriented toward micro-interaction and not group politics. Social exchange theory
has little to say about social networks, though some of it has extended into generalized exchange
among more than two people. However, it is a very short step to say that many more and valued
alternatives could be gained from information and contacts generated by larger social networks.

4-Power in Social Networks: Scott Feld (1981) finds some previous approaches to
social networks have to be "atheoretical" or "self-contained," and as a result, have not connected
to the larger context of business, government, and other interest groups. For instance, measuring
the individual centrality of individuals within a given network might tell who in a network is
likely to have more power, but that "self-contained network" information is not useful to most
political sociology studies. Larger coalitions, as described by Logan and Molotch (1987, 2007)
shows how place entrepreneurs and government officials can form important coalitions. Holistic
networks, sometimes represented by coalitions, are much better than egocentric networks,
whether they are for individuals or political groups. If extensive network information is
available, one can use this broader type of network structure such as eigenvector centrality
(EVC) to measure the importance of a group node in a coalition network (Bonacich 1972). EVC
attempts to discover powerful actors by examining what actors are the most connected to other
well-connected actors. But this type of detailed network information is not always available.
This is relevant to power especially in organizational settings because oftentimes power
lies with individuals who have access to other members in the network, but may not connected to
everyone themselves (as in simple degree centrality). To better illustrate this consider the chief
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executive officer of a large corporation. Centrality measures other than EVC may not identify the
CEO as 'central' because he or she might only speak to 6 top level managers. However,
eigenvector would capture that the CEO, despite their degree centrality of only 6 was the most
'central' actor because of the connections of his or her top level managers that take into
consideration their more numerous connections.
In measuring EVC, relative scores are assigned to all nodes in the network based on the
principle that connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the score of the node in
question than equal connections to low-scoring nodes. For example, college football team
evaluators compute a "ratings percentage index" (RPI) of each team based on their past networks
of 10 or so opponents in a season. The RPI consists of a percentage of a team's wins and losses
record, a percentage of this team's opponents' average winning percentage, and even a
percentage of the team's opponent's opponent's winning percentage. The last two items
constitute the team's "strength of schedule" irrespective of how well the team does (i.e., they
could have tough schedule whether they win or lose all their games).
In political contests, groups in coalitions have rough equivalents of RPI measures.
Although they do not have clear schedules of games, they do have conflicts where two types of
resources are important:
( 1) financial power resources in terms of money and credit, and
(2) networks of people that will produce voters inclined to vote one way or another and
for some to actually participate in the political process.
As a result of the differences in group resources based on money and votes embedded in social
networks, those with the greater resources most often play a primary leadership or causal role in
determining the direction of politics and the ultimate results of various political bargaining
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processes. In policy debates and legislative action to pass actual laws, a metric between money
and people is hard to determine. But clearly some interest groups are more powerful than othersnamely, business groups control much larger pools of monetary resources, political parties and
leaders have some control over voters, and neighborhood social networks allow various deals to
be made with grass roots groups and these other parties.

Synthesizing Three Theories
In putting this theory together, the different epistemological standings of these last three
.,
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theories need to be taken into account in two ways. First, power resources theory is somewhat
oriented toward the past or present. In a legislature, it is often measured by political party power,
which was determined in the most recent but still 'past' electio

••

Second, with power

dependency theory, the calculation of the number of alternatives and their values is a somewhat
counterfactual endeavor that largely occurs in the future. One can have an alternative that he/she
may or may not take advantage of with differing probabilities of success in obtaining different
amounts of value. One can also bluff concerning the realism of these alternatives. Thus, the basis
of power dependency is in the future, though not totally speculative. While "counterfactuality" is
not precise, it does signal what may happen in the future (most often near future) rather than a
post-power result. And people act on the basis of their expectations or predicted estimates.
In this paper we take examples of political competition in a moderately sized city. While
politics are nominally non-partisan, there exist clear liberal and conservative blocks. We
operationalize political competition first through power resources theory, and then using
exchange theory with subjective probability estimations of outcomes. In figure 1, the principal
competitors for political power to accept a particular policy are capital, local grass roots groups,
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and local government with the possibility that the public sphere could be activated by the media
(i.e., local and national business or capital as B1 and Bn, local and national state government as S1
and Sn, local and national grass roots groups as GR1 and GRn, and local and national media as M 1
and Mn).
********** Figure 1 about here**********
Each local actor is potentially connected to a national actor that is not directly involved in local
policy debate (B1->Bn, S1->Sn, GR1->GRn, and M1->Mn), and whether the national actors
become involved can be an important mobilization issue (e.g., see the immigration debates in
Arizona that involve the federal government's lack of enforcement). Each local actor is
connected to various power resources of money, people (votes), and publics (public opinion and
social networks) depending on their choice of policy alternatives.
The comparative alternatives and values from exchange theory are added in Figure 2, as
are the comparative resources in people and money from power resources theory.
********** Figure 2 about here**********
This makes the diagram much more complicated, but it also clearly shows that the resources and
alternatives are quite imbalanced. Clearly, local actors have fewer alternatives than national
actors, but among each local and national set, business has the most alternatives followed by
political actors. Local grass roots and status groups have the fewest alternatives since they have
the fewest monetary connections. However, they do have high potential people and public
connections. On the basis of resources that can be initially mobilized, business should get its
way.

@SNP
However, each group is not assuredly unified or even capable of being unified. Each

'fhird. ,I

#I

group is challenged by the building of coalitions among themselves. This is how social networks
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need to be assessed for business, grassroots, state and public sphere. Social networks enter into
the political bargaining process in three ways: (1) through the generation of valued alternatives,
-:::

-

.

-

(2) through the formation and maintenance of coalitions, and (3) the public sphere needs to be
~

~

brought on board or kept out of the fray.

(1)

The first process is the generation and promotion of valued alternatives. Although some
alternatives are easily apparent (i.e., the old and tired ones of doing nothing or doing what has
been done many times before with weak results), good alternatives with high value are not easily
found. Alternatives must be recognized and packaged as being relevant to a group's experiences.
Feld's focus theory is important here in bringing numbers of people together to emphasize a

possible solution or strategy. The point of focus theory is that a social network needs a number of
foci (see also the cognitive literature on 'anchors' and social movement literature on 'framing'),
and for a political network to thrive this focus must be discovered, it must be sold to the network,
and to continue on, it needs to work reasonably well (Feld, 1981: 1019-20). Feld does not
provide any political examples, but he does characterize this creation of alternatives or foci as
loosely connected clusters that resonate within a larger context that then finds them useful. As
these foci are used and are extended over time, the clusters become a bit more tightly connected
and their creators or adopters gain centrality. However, it is important to note that the focus
leaders did not start out with centrality as they thrived in loosely connected networks.
The second process of social networks is at a more aggregate level. It concerns how the
social networks sort out the many different types of foci within their loosely connected views in
an organization, and then how organizations sort out their commonalities and differences in
establishing coalitions among themselves to gain a particular policy or political outcome.
Alternatives made for some clusters may not fit well with other clusters so they need to be
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translated, resonances enhanced, and bridges made (Feld, 1981: 1022-24). This too requires
creative energy in bringing about a larger focus or vision that binds different clusters in an
organization, and different groups in a coalition.
The third process involves the media and public opinion. The media are usually pro-

Qs)

business but they can tum against various projects. Business has public relations departments to
manage this, but various social movement cause can create news and highlight various injustices
involved. How the media and public opinion are managed can be critical to the outcomes.
Two political controversies and two somewhat counterfactual conflicts are mapped out in
Figure 3, which allows us to examine both existing and hegemonic coalitions in Lexington,
Kentucky, a city of250,000 people.
********** Figure 3 about here**********
In item a, a counterfactual pattern of coalitions is mapped out concerning the building of a large
mall in North Lexington, which is strongly recognized as horse farm country. This coalition
would bring national business and media together (Bn and Mn), but it would be massively
opposed by local elites especially from the horse industry, not to mention grass roots groups (B1,
Sn, S1, M1). This coalition would be easily and quickly defeated if it were proposed. On the other
hand, in item c, the proposal to build a large shopping center in south Lexington near Interstate
1-75 was passed and quickly built without much trouble (i.e., the 300 acre Hamburg Pavilion).
This coalition brought both levels of capital, both levels of government, and general media
support to the table (Bn, B1, Sn, S1, Mn, M1) and grass roots groups never really mobilized to
oppose it (GRn and GR1). The two issues actually debated come under two different political
administrations: Mayor Teresa Isaacs' liberal and Mayor James Newberry's business-oriented
administrations. The two issues covered are the city taking over the private water supply
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corporation by eminent domain, and the building of a major hotel and shops covering a whole
city block entailing the condemnation of a large number of businesses. Item b diagrams the
city/county's plan to condemn and then buy the private water company, and item d shows the
Centre Pointe controversy over destroying a city block and building a skyscraper hotel. These

.J
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two cases represent difficult coalition formation issues, which are the focus of this paper.

Three principles are important for coalitionformation.f!!.irst, large~oalitions generally
prevail over smaller coalitions.@econd, the local actors who can mobilize their larger state and
national counterparts will have more power.{!hird, the coalitions must be weighted by their
power resources which are measured by the number of alternatives with a high probability of
occurring and with a high value. Thus, it is critical to know if business at the local and
state/national levels, government at both levels, and the grass roots at both levels (labor, gender,
or ethnic areas) can be mobilized for a cause and how they form coalitions with powerful others.

The~onrth aspect of social networks is that the message can be spread throughout the public
sphere, or the public sphere can be neutralized so that the issue is barely covered. This coalition
size is not enough and power resources must be included.

- c~
r .... ~ \e.o.deo;.

The next level of putting it together involves connecting the coalitions to social

networks that connect to the power resources that each group controls. Each actor (i.e., B1, Bn,
S1, Sn .... etc.) is not monolithic but consists of social networks converging (or not converging)
on various alternatives with different values of outcomes. The actual process of coalition
formation then requires both coalition size and their power resources. Social networks are
intimately intertwined with the ability to create alternatives with high probabilities of occurring
that will produce high values or resources. Thus, the networks are involved within possible
bargaining actors (Bn) and between them (Bn and Sn) and their many or few alternatives. Local

11

power brokers have been shown to be networked through series of board memberships, board
memberships, and affiliations with clubs, charitable organizations, or other social foci (Hunter
1953, Domhoff 1978). These ties are not constantly mobilized by actors who seek to alter policy
but they present a range of alternatives that more powerful actors can use. It also leads to more
multiplex relations oflocal policy discussion that can make their actions flexible depending on
changing circumstances. Grassroots level groups may be able to mobilize a fairly large number
of people, but they have much more trouble developing alternatives with high value.
Nonetheless, actors who are highly central to these social networks play a key role in collation
formation for two primary reasons: (1) actors with greater degree centrality and network size are
connected more people who can reach more organizations, and (2) Bonacich's measure of
centrality has been shown to be accurate at predicting power usage in experimental exchange
networks (Borgatti and Everett 2006). Individuals who possess such power might do so by
successfully coercing others to join their coalition. But again, the second factor of value, whether
money or people, flows from the greater accumulation of valued alternatives.
The following case studies with more complex coalitions combine these two forms of
power resources through dependency and network centrality in coalitions. We make some
assumptions to score the coalitions: (a) business has twice as many resources as the state or
media, (b) local institutions are twice as strong as national groups in determining a local issue,
(c) the state and media are twice as strong as the grass roots. A simple scoring scheme will be as
follows: Bn=2, B1=4, Sn=l, S1=2, Mn=l, M1=2, GRn=0.5, and GR1=l. The total score is 13.5,
which means that a winning coalition needs 7 or more to win. Since unified business scores a 6,
they only need a small amount to reach 7. If business is split, then a larger coalition of the other
groups is possible. These assumptions are somewhat arbitrary in this case, but they would be
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derived from the balance of alternatives times values in determining available resources, and
they generally reflect relative inequalities between these groups. The winning coalitions in two
case studies along with two hegemonically determined case studies will be calculated from these
scores, and they are listed at the bottom each section a, b, c and d in figure 3.1 Cases a and c are
hegemonically overdetermined, and cases b and d are discussed below.

Two Case Studies
Case 1- Buying the Water Company. Just a few days after 9/11 RWE-AG (a German
based multi-national utility company (Rhenisch-Westfalischen Elektrizitiitswerks Aktiengesellschaft) bought American Water Works Inc. After RWE-AG bought Thames Water of the
UK, it was the third largest water firm in the world. Ownership of the water company being in
the city's best interest was one of the most central issues to the 2002 Mayoral race in Lexington.
The non-partisan race for mayor of Lexington was between local politician and housing advocate
Teresa Isaac and Attorney Scott Crosbie. Isaac refused money from an official political party and
narrowly defeated Crosbie who accepted a $150,000 in-kind donation from the State Republican
party and $1,000 Kentucky-America's president. Isaac would spend much of her next 4 years
trying to exercise eminent domain over the water company. As a critic of Crosbie said in a local
newspaper article, "This election is a referendum to show whether Lexington is a relatively
liberal college town or a religious and conservative suburban community" (Cheves et al. 2002).
The debate of the water company was also a polarizing factor in the debate. The water company
issue played the significant role in the election probably because of public hostility toward
German ownership of the water company (Cheves et al. 2002).

1

These estimates are a shortcut for this article. Actual estimations of resource power would require listing
alternatives and probabilities, and then summing up the expected values.
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This idea to buy the private water company came from Chattanooga, Tennessee who
attempted but failed to buy their water company. With xenophobia running high after 9/11, the
debate was pushed forward by liberals who detested a huge conglomerate with a spotty
envirornnental record. Many people feared a foreign company having control of Lexington's
water supply. Two years later in January of 2003, American Water Works shareholders, the PSC
and federal regulators approved the German buyout of the American company.
Isaac would face a tough four year term as Lexington's mayor. The battle over the water
company quickly became framed as a debate between "big government" practicing eminent
domain vs. private business. Local groups with some assistance from national envirornnental
organizations, such as Green Corps a non-profit organization offering internships and training in
envirornnental activism, attempted to aid in the mobilization of Lexington residents for local
ownership. Meanwhile RWE-AG spent large amounts of capital to change public relations with
its firm and fund opposition to the city's bid. The Republicans fought a public vote on the matter
because eminent domain was an ideological threat to free enterprise. Eventually the Kentucky
Supreme Court blocked a public vote in November of 2005.
Two items related to our theory are important. First, the local business elite shifted from
supporting public ownership to being split by a coalition of well-resourced business leaders who
were in favor of stopping public ownership. Reporter Andy Mead (2006) said that the supporters
of local ownership were older, Lexington elites, but those against city control were the residents
of newer neighborhoods. The older elites had little contact with the newcomers in South
Lexington, and they could not persuade the growing 'new money' south side that was much
more pro-business. The newcomers opposed condenmation by "big government." One prominent
representative against city ownership was the Vice-mayor Mike Scanlon, who as a constant and
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highly vocal opponent of most oflsaac's proposals. He owned a restaurant franchise and even
proposed privatizing the city/county waste management system. While his influence is not
enough to say that the local state was split, but it is symbolic of how the local business
community became fractured. This gradual shift of power in Lexington from "old money" to
"new money"split the business community on the issue.
Second, the RWE-AG was a peculiar private firm with limited alternatives because the

water company could not threaten the city by saying that it would move to another location and
the Fayette county would lose jobs and taxes. The water company was tied to its customers and
could not leave the area without losing its raison d'etre for existence - selling water to the local
residents (see Molotoch and Logan, 2007, on utilities). Consequently, its alternatives were
severely limited.
A petition overruled the court decision preventing a vote, and the buyout of the water
company was put on the ballot for general elections of 2006. The result was an overwhelming
"no" to local ownership. This was largely credited to the Water Company and its supporters
framing of the debate and resources in sustaining a long battle over the issue versus the city.
Many supporters had also tired of the issue being dragged out for five years, and these former
supporters were disillusioned. The issue had dominated Isaac's term and her other missteps led
to declining local support. Thus, the battle became costly to the city budget and to Isaac's
political support. She was a vulnerable opponent for the 2006 mayoral race. Running on a probusiness platform opposed to the water company buyout, Jim Newberry won the election by the
largest margin since Lexington had a city-county merger in 1980.
In terms of our network coalition model in figure 3, the proposal to buy the water
company initially had a lot of coalition support (S1 +B1 + GRn + GR1+ M1) from the city
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government, grass roots groups, and the media. In our scoring system, it had 2+4+ 1+0.5+2 or
8.5, which is a winning coalition given the resource weights. It was opposed by national
business interests and ideological tenor of the Bush Administration (Bn + Gn + Mn with a score of
4). But business became split and as the debate became more acrimonious, the local media tired
of the issue and became negative. This shifted the power of the coalitions in the opposite
direction. The pro-purchase coalition (S1 +Bia+ GRn + GR,) dropped to a score of 5.5 and the
anti-purchase coalition (Bn + Gn +Mn+ M1) rose to 8. The split in local business divided their
score to 2 for the pro-purchase and 2 for the anti-purchase groups. The scoring results in a
defeated with 5.5 < 8 with local business being split. This example shows how the local
networks of the state and grass-roots could opposed corporate interests of a weakened private
corporation with few alternatives (i.e., you can't threaten to leave your water customers). In a
less pro-business national context (e.g., under the early President Obama's administration instead
of President Bush's), this effort may have succeeded.

Case 2 - Developing Centre Pointe. In March, 2008 a new development project was
launched Lexington to build a $250 million Centre Pointe Project. It was to be a 40-story
building in the heart of Lexington's downtown. This building would house a four-star hotel,
luxury condominiums, and retail stores. Construction required destruction of a block of buildings
dating back to 1826 called Morton's Row. The Webb Company was the developer for this
project and they came from a wealthy Kentucky family that has a very public and checkered past
with the city of Lexington. Two past dealings had received wide coverage and shaped the
Webb's image to many residents of Lexington: the defunct Kentucky Central Life Insurance
Company and the Festival Market. The first project went bankrupt, and the second project never
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turned a profit despite using a 2.1 million dollar loan from the city, which the Webbs were able
to escape.
Ibis Centre Pointe project was contrary to a two-year long $500,000 "Downtown Master
Plan" developed by the Downtown Development Authority. The eventual plan for
"revitalization" for Lexington's downtown called for more residential housing, limits on building
height, two-way (instead of one-way streets), development that would 'connect' the University
of Kentucky basketball arena with downtown, and also making the area more pedestrian and
cyclist friendly. The plan was well-received by many local developers and neighborhood groups
alike. Local real-estate developers stood to make large profits off of city supported development
in the downtown area. Neighborhoods close to the downtown area stood to gain from higher
property values and use values associated with having 'vital' downtown. This also solidified a
plan to "build Lexington up not out" a mantra that was converted into bumper stickers and highly
defended by the wealthy horse farmers outside of metro Lexington. The Webb's claimed that
since the city council had failed to enact the entire plan, it was not binding and could therefore be
ignored. Critics on the city council called the plan a failure because the developers were able to
ignore it, especially in planning Centre Pointe.
Coalitions formed amongst organizations and individuals to oppose and to support the
new project. Business organizations such as Lexington's Chamber of Commerce (B1) tended to
,1.,,"1\,~1,_~

'" "'

.
support the Webb's. The
Mayor~ was one of the most vocal supporters of Centre Pointe and

staked a lot of his public opinion on the debate. Many actually felt that the decision to build was
largely a closed process between the Webbs and the Mayor. Fueling this was a blogger's posting
that the Webbs and their business partners donated about $13,000 into Newberry's mayoral
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campaign. The city council while not unanimous tended to follow the Mayor's lead. But how did
the other local groups coalesce on this issue?
In Lexington many social groups exist among horse farmers and other groups that are
against urban expansion and "the destruction of bluegrass forever" (a popular bumper sticker).
These preservation groups come in the form of organizations with many elite members from the
community who can make sizeable financial donations and sit on the boards of directors of nonprofits and some banks. They often hold fundraisers that garner support from others, especially
financial donations and promises of political support. However, these preservation groups had
two problems.
First, the "Bluegrass Forever" environmental group was not threatened by a downtown
project and they were largely silent on the debate. These groups also have many overlaps with
the Chamber of Commerce and other prestigious charitable boards to which many of Lexington's
business community belong. These organizations frame many of their goals in environmental
terms, but the destruction of a city block and extensive new construction was hardly a green
undertaking, even with an environmental building certification. But unlike the water company
issue, Bluegrass Forever remained on the side lines during the debate because the issue did not
directly affect them. The preferred targeting rural expansion rather than urban infill.
Second, there were other problems with coalition building with the two other
environmental preservation groups - the Bluegrass Trust and Preserve Lexington. The block
scheduled for demolition included "The Dame," which was the most popular live music venue
for college students in the city. Young students joined Preserve Lexington rather than the
Bluegrass Trust, which consisted mainly of long-time Lexington residents who were not
interested in a late-night rock and punk music venue. Further, student housing needs in the city
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often threatened the Bluegrass Trust's interest in preserving quiet neighborhoods. In other words,
loud music and rowdy parties did not mix with preserving quiet and charming neighborhoods.
With Bluegrass Forever on the sidelines, Preserve Lexington and Bluegrass Trust both
opposed the construction of Centre Pointe but in very different ways. Preserve Lexington
engaged in direct action and protest events like "Block Aid." Eventually, they sued and delayed
the build. Preserve Lexington wrote letters to the paper but avoided other action. The two groups
collaborated little. With the eventual destruction of the block, the building of new bars, the
relocation of some of the old ones in the revitalization of the distillery district, interest waned.
And at the end of the school year with student leaving for home, Preserve Lexington halted their
direct action and the Bluegrass Forever simply wrote letters to the editor.
In terms of our model in figure 3, the numbers of coalition partners were the same as the
previous model. The "yes coalition" on Centre Point (Bn+B1+Sn +S1+ M1) with a score of 10 was
clearly greater than the "no coalition" (GRn + GR1 + Mn) with a score of 3.5. Not only were the
more powerful coalition members were in the yes camp rather, but the opposition coalition was
consisted only of grass roots groups possibly bolstered by national media (see Figure 2, part c).
Business was united rather than split, and so was the larger government (i.e., Senators) though
national government was not very much involved. Further, the alternatives of business were
much greater than with the Water Company. Centre Pointe would create many jobs, and the
Webbs could have easily taken their money and gone to any of a thousand locations throughout
the country. That they picked Lexington in the first place was due to their 'loyalty' to the area
-

(plus the pull that they may also have locally). Thus, when business and government are united
and on the same side, grass roots groups will have a difficult time.
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Conclusion

In many ways, theory is like a flashlight in the dark. It can be used to shine light into
areas that are not often observed. The model proposed in this paper shines this light in three
different directions to measure power:
I -According to social network theory, this synthetic theory focuses on the social
networks of actors and how these social networks lead to more or less eigenvector
centrality, which can be measured at 2nd and 3rd order connections (like a football
strength of schedule measure). But this centrality then needs to lead to the measurement
of resources in terms of more or fewer valued-alternatives and networked coalitions. A
further challenge of this method is to find the strengths or weaknesses of 2nd and 3rd order
network connections.
2-According to power dependency theory, this synthetic theory focuses on specific
alternatives and their attached resources and indicates that power resources come from
these alternatives. But subjective probabilities about alternatives are shaped, hidden or
accentuated by considerable framing, persuasion and even chicanery. A further challenge
of this method is actually calculating alternatives, probabilities and sunnning expected
values.
3-According to power resources and coalition theory, this synthetic theory puts these
networks and alternatives into a measurement scheme for coalitions to observe how local
coalitions win or lose political issues due to their accumulation or lack of power. We did
not go as far as to estimate all the alternatives and the probabilities that are associated
with them, but the theory points toward further specification of these elements of a more
detailed theory of power.
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This synthetic approach avoids the view that business always wins with an overly structuralist
and deterministic approach (as item a in Figure 3 was avoided), but at the same time, it indicates
that business has a distinct advantage rooted in power resources and dependency. Mobilization
of these resources requires social networks which are both a resource and a pathway for
resources to travel through. By better understanding how ties develop between individuals and
subsequently organizations that seek to influence political processes it serves to better understand
the development and maintenance of power within these networks.
By synthesizing social networks into the broader discussion of power into sociology we
hope to enrich the discourse and provide promising avenues for the future examination of power.
Power is a subject that is critical in both social network analysis and political sociology yet both
fields tend to run parallel to one another. With the theory proposed in this paper we hope to
merge some of these discussions. This is important because many sociologists criticize social
network analysis as atheoretical. This criticism at times is warranted, yet for sociologist to
dismiss such powerful analysis altogether is "throwing the baby out with the bathwater".
But this theory can be developed further. While we have provided some aspects
changing coalitions, especially with the Water Company case, it is clear that power relations
develop through a process where resources can decay or grow, and alternatives may appear or
disappear. Putting the development of political power into this process approach will continue
the effort to go beyond mere structural differences in resources. Also the tactical interaction in
framing and presenting issues and alternatives is a major tactical and possibly strategic issue.
Finally, one can conceive of a contingency theory such that power resources theory may
be stronger when ideas are stable and parties can gain more representatives through their voters.
On the other hand, power dependency theory may be stronger where new alternatives are
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available that can convert opponents into supporters (not usually representatives, but certainly
voters who may switch parties or sides). And social networks may be stronger in predicting
power if 2nd and 3rd order nodes prove to be central in their networks (e.g., a comparison of
Obama and Clinton's campaign organizational networks using the strength of schedule example).
While we are proposing a theoretical synthesis rather than a contingency theory, the possibility
that facets of this theory have different strengths or weaknesses given new contexts is enticing.
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Figure 2: Power Resources and Social Network Theory of Political Interaction on a Local Issue
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Figure 3: Coalitions and Networks of Political Actors
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c. Hegemonically passed (no opposition)
Local and national business builds a large mall
in a greenfield location not in horse country
near I-75 called Hamburg Pavilion.
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d. Little contest: Proposed
.
Effort of business to build t e Centre Pointe
hotel complex in downtowriand
condemn historic buildings. ~

Local business in the horse and other industries (score=4)
With a split: B1a=horse industry=2, and B1b=South Lexington noveau riche=2.
Big business capital of developers and bankers (score=2)
Local city-county government (score=2)
State and national government (score= 1)
Local grass roots social movements (score=l)
State and national grass roots environmental groups (score=0.5)
Local media of newspapers and TV (score=2)
National and state of Kentucky media (score=l)
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